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We introduce several families of quantum fingerprinting protocols to evaluate the equality function on two
n-bit strings in the simultaneous message passing model. The original quantum fingerprinting protocol uses a
tensor product of a small number of O(logn)-qubit high dimensional signals [1], whereas a recently-proposed
optical protocol uses a tensor product of O(n) single-qubit signals, while maintaining the O(logn) information
leakage of the original protocol [2]. We find a family of protocols which interpolate between the original and
optical protocols while maintaining the O(logn) information leakage, thus demonstrating a trade-off between
the number of signals sent and the dimension of each signal.
There has been interest in experimental realization of the recently-proposed optical protocol using coherent
states [3, 4], but as the required number of laser pulses grows linearly with the input size n, eventual challenges
for the long-time stability of experimental set-ups arise. We find a coherent state protocol which reduces the
number of signals by a factor 1/2 while also reducing the information leakage. Our reduction makes use of a
simple modulation scheme in optical phase space, and we find that more complex modulation schemes are not
advantageous. Using a similar technique, we improve a recently-proposed coherent state protocol for evaluating
the Euclidean distance between two real unit vectors [5] by reducing the number of signals by a factor 1/2 and
also reducing the information leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work we introduce several families of equality pro-
tocols in the simultaneous message passing model. In this
model, two parties (Alice and Bob) receive inputs x,y ∈
{0,1}n respectively, conditioned on which they each send
classical or quantum states to the referee, who performs a
measurement to determine the output of some function f (x,y).
We consider the case in which f is the equality function. We
are interested in protocols which minimize the information
leakage, that is, the amount of information the referee learns
about the parties’ inputs. Using classical states, the informa-
tion leakage is lower bounded byΩ(
√
n) [6]. In contrast, there
exist protocols using quantum states with information leakage
O(logn) [1, 2].
The original quantum fingerprinting protocol uses
O(logn)-qubit highly entangled signals and a controlled-
swap measurement [1]. A more recent and experimentally
realizable “optical” protocol uses a tensor product of O(n)
binary phase-modulated laser pulses, which can be repre-
sented as qubits, and a beamsplitter comparison measurement
[2]. In this work, we find a family of protocols which
interpolate between these two, exhibiting a trade-off between
the number of signals sent and the dimension of each signal.
We show that this family of protocols has information leakage
O(logn).
The optical protocol of [2] has been implemented using co-
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herent states [3, 4], but as the required number of laser pulses
grows linearly with the input size n, large inputs become dif-
ficult to handle due to the limited long-time stability of exper-
imental set-ups. We reduce the number of signals by a factor
1/2, while also reducing the information leakage, by utilizing
the imaginary component of the phase space representation of
coherent states. We find several natural generalizations of this
protocol which further reduce the number of signals, but find
numerical evidence that the information leakage of these pro-
tocols is higher in both the ideal and experimental settings,
even under an abstract, optimal measurement performed by
the referee.
Using a similar technique, we also reduce the number of
signals and information leakage of a recently-proposed coher-
ent state protocol for evaluating the Euclidean distance be-
tween two real unit vectors [5], and find a similar protocol for
complex unit vectors.
In addition, in Appendix A we prove a tangentially related
result that a simple beamsplitter measurement similar to that
used in [7] achieves optimal unambiguous state comparison
(USC) between any two coherent states of equal amplitude
and opposite phase when the states are given with equal a pri-
ori probabilities. Optimal USC of two states given with equal
a priori probabilities was first solved in [8] and generalized
to arbitrary a priori probabilities in [9]. A method to realize
the optimal USC of two single-photon states prepared with
arbitrary a priori probabilities is proposed in [10], but to our
knowledge optimal USC has not yet been experimentally re-
alized. The beamsplitter scheme has the advantage of being
experimentally realizable, with the drawback of being sub-
optimal for not-equal a priori probabilities.
The main text is organized as follows. In Section II we
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2interpolate between the original and existing optical equality
protocols. In Section III we introduce our coherent state pro-
tocols which improve on the existing optical equality and Eu-
clidean distance protocols, and find numerical evidence that
some natural generalizations to coherent state equality proto-
cols using fewer signals have higher information leakage. In
Section IV we derive the information leakage bounds we have
used for our protocols.
II. INTERPOLATION
The original equality protocol of [1] uses a small number
of O(logn)-qubit signals, whereas an existing optical equal-
ity protocol of [2] uses a tensor product ofO(n) binary phase-
modulated coherent state signals, which can be represented
as single qubits (a notion formalized in Section II A). In this
section we interpolate between the original and optical pro-
tocols, thus demonstrating a trade-off between the number of
signals sent and the dimension of each signal. In Sections II A
and II B we introduce slight adaptations to the existing proto-
cols which are more natural candidates for the interpolation,
and in Section II C we interpolate between these adaptations.
Before proceeding, we outline a general protocol frame-
work which we will use for all equality protocols that we con-
sider. First, Alice and Bob receive inputs x,y∈ {0,1}n respec-
tively, conditioned on which they send pure states |ψx〉, |ψy〉
to the referee which are sufficiently distinguishable when
x 6= y. The referee then performs a comparison measurement
on |ψxy〉 := |ψx〉 |ψy〉 and outputs either Equal or NotEqual.
We define the error probability of the protocol as the worst
case error probability over all x,y ∈ {0,1}n. In the ideal set-
ting, the error probability of every protocol is one-sided: if
the inputs are equal the referee will always output Equal. In
every protocol, the states |ψx〉 are product vectors. We refer
to individual tensor factors of |ψx〉 as signals, and to the entire
object |ψx〉 as a state. For many protocols that we consider,
the states will contain multiple copies of identical signals.
To make the states sufficiently distinguishable to the ref-
eree when x 6= y, Alice and Bob map their inputs x,y to code-
words E(x),E(y)∈ {0,1}m of an error-correcting code E char-
acterized by some minimum distance. They then encode these
codewords into states |ψx〉, |ψy〉 whose overlap is a decreasing
function of the distance between codewords. The code E is
chosen to have constant minimum distance mδ and constant
rate, which we will see ensures that the states used in each
protocol are sufficiently distinguishable to the referee and give
rise to information leakage O(logn).
A. Adaptation of existing optical equality protocol
Now we review the existing optical equality protocol of [2]
(in the ideal setting) and propose a slight adaptation which
is a more natural candidate for the interpolation. In the ex-
isting optical protocol, the j-th signal is one of two coher-
ent states depending on the j-th codeletter of the codeword
E(x) ∈ {0,1}m [2]
|αx〉EQ,1 =
m⊗
j=1
∣∣∣∣(−1)E(x) j α√m
〉
j
. (1)
For each index j, the referee interferes the j−th pair of signals
received from Alice and Bob in a beamsplitter, and measures
the dark port with a single photon threshold detector, obtain-
ing one of two outcomes: “dark port detection” or “no dark
port detection”. The referee outputs NotEqual if at least one
outcome “dark port detection” occurs. On input |βa〉 |βb〉, out-
come “no dark port detection” occurs with probability
|〈βa,βb〉|= e−
1
2 |βa−βb|2 . (2)
It follows that the error probability given different inputs x 6= y
is equal to | 〈αx,αy〉 |, and the error probability given equal
inputs is zero. The worst case error probability occurs when
the codewords differ by minimum distance mδ bits, and is
equal to exp[−2 |α|2 δ ], which is brought to within any ε > 0
through appropriate choice of α .
In the existing optical protocol, the set of two possible co-
herent states for each signal span a two-dimensional space,
and thus can be written in a basis as (i.e. they are isomet-
rically equivalent to) two qubits |qε0〉, |qε1〉 with inner product
determined by ε . The beamsplitter measurement can also be
converted to this basis (see Appendix A). By the invariance of
entropy under isometries, the information leakage (defined in
Section IV) is equal for protocols using states that are equal
up to change of basis.
In contrast to the existing optical protocol, the original pro-
tocol of [1] attains the desired error probability ε by sending
multiple copies of signals which are fixed independent of ε .
To facilitate our interpolation between these two protocols, we
adapt the optical protocol to more closely resemble the orig-
inal by fixing qubits |q′0〉, |q′1〉 independent of ε , and sending
identical copies of each qubit signal until ε is attained (we re-
fer to each individual copy as a signal). In the coherent state
basis, this corresponds to fixing the amplitude of each signal
independent of ε (any two qubits can be written in a basis as
coherent states). Define the repetition number r as the num-
ber of copies sent to attain ε . The referee uses the qubit-basis
beamsplitter measurement described in Appendix A on each
signal, and outputs NotEqual if any outcome “dark port detec-
tion” occurs.
Remarkably, as the probability (2) of “no dark port detec-
tion” is given by the overlap between the input pair of sig-
nals, it follows that if ε is attained with equality in both the
existing optical protocol and our adapted protocol, then the
states used in each protocol are equal up to a change of ba-
sis. Specifically, the set of signals {| α√m 〉, |−α√m 〉} used in the
existing optical protocol are equal up to a change of basis
to the set of unit vectors {|q′0〉⊗r, |q′1〉⊗r} containing the r
copies of each signal used in our adapted protocol. Indeed,
the worst case error probability is given by ε = | 〈q′0,q′1〉 |mδ r =
| 〈−α√m , α√m 〉 |
mδ , so | 〈q′0,q′1〉 |r = | 〈−α√m , α√m 〉 |, which completes
the proof by Property 3 of [11] that two sets of unit vectors
3{|va〉 ∈ Hv}a∈Z ,{|wa〉 ∈ Hw}a∈Z are equal up to change of
basis if and only if there exist real numbers θa,a ∈ Z such
that 〈va,vb〉= ei(θa−θb) 〈wa,wb〉 for all a,b ∈ Z. Note that the
choice of coherent state amplitude α√m for the optical proto-
col thus corresponds to the choice α√rm for our adapted optical
protocol in the coherent state basis.
B. Adaptation of original equality protocol
Here we describe the original quantum fingerprinting proto-
col of [1], and propose a slight adaptation which is a more nat-
ural candidate for the interpolation. Similarly to the adapted
optical protocol, in the original protocol Alice and Bob send
identical copies of the signals
|ψ(m)x 〉= 1√m
m
∑
i=1
|i〉 |E(x)i〉 (3)
until the desired error probability ε is attained. On each
pair of signals |ψ(m)xy 〉 := |ψ(m)x 〉|ψ(m)y 〉 sent by Alice and
Bob, the referee performs a controlled-swap measurement
(effectively a projective measurement onto the symmetric
and anti-symmetric subspaces), which returns outcome “anti-
symmetric” with probability ‖ 12 (1−W)|ψ
(m)
xy 〉‖2, where W is
the operator which swaps the state of Alice and Bob’s sys-
tems. The referee outputs NotEqual if any outcome “anti-
symmetric” occurs. The worst case error probability occurs
when the codewords differ by minimum distance mδ bits, and
is given by (1−δ (1− δ2 ))r for repetition number r [1].
In our adapted original protocol, the signals used are the
same but the referee instead performs a direct sum of the
controlled-swap measurement with the qubit-basis beamsplit-
ter measurement. We use this measurement for the interpo-
lation because on one end, in the adapted optical protocol, it
converges to the beamsplitter measurement (see Section II C);
and on the other end, in the adapted original protocol, it
closely resembles (and slightly improves on) the controlled-
swap measurement.
Operationally, the measurement in the adapted original pro-
tocol proceeds as follows. First, the referee performs a non-
destructive measurement on |ψ(m)xy 〉with two measurement op-
erators, the first (second) of which projects onto the subspace
containing the first (second) term of the decomposition
|ψ(m)xy 〉= 1m
m
∑
i=1
|i〉 |E(x)i〉 |i〉 |E(y)i〉
+
1
m
m
∑
l,h=1
l 6=h
|l〉 |E(x)l〉 |h〉 |E(y)h〉 . (4)
If the non-destructive measurement projects onto the first sub-
space, the referee performs a measurement which applies the
identity matrix to the first and third registers, and to the two-
qubit space contained in the second and fourth registers it ap-
plies the measurement operators Md and Mnd, implicitly de-
fined in Appendix A, which correspond to the measurement
outcomes “dark port detection” and “no dark port detection”,
respectively. If the measurement projects onto the second sub-
space, the referee performs the controlled-swap measurement
on the entire state. The referee outputs NotEqual if any out-
come “dark port detection” or “anti-symmetric” occur. In Ap-
pendix B 1 we show that this protocol has worst case error
probability
PrIm(Err) =
[
1−δ
(
1− δ
2
+
1
2m
)]r
, (5)
a minor improvement over the original protocol.
In Appendix A we show that the qubit-basis beamsplitter
measurement on the two-qubit space contained in the second
and fourth registers can be further decomposed as a direct
sum of the controlled-swap measurement with an unambigu-
ous state discrimination measurement. Thus, the full adapted
measurement on the larger Hilbert space can also be decom-
posed in this way.
C. Interpolation between adapted protocols
Now we find a family of protocols which interpolates be-
tween the adapted protocols described in Sections II A and
II B, thus demonstrating a trade-off between the number of
signals sent and the dimension of each signal. In the interpo-
lation protocol with block size k, blocks of k bits of E(x) are
encoded into each signal:
|ψ(k)x 〉=
dm/ke⊗
j=1
[
1√
k
∑
i∈I[ j,k]
|i〉
∣∣∣q(k)E(x)i〉
]
∈ (Ck⊗C2)⊗dmk e,
(6)
where |q(k)0 〉, |q(k)1 〉 are qubits. The set I[ j,k] indexes the j-th
block of k bits, i.e. it is the set of integers in the range [( j−
1)k+1, jk]. If k does not divide m the remaining qubits in the
final signal are set to |q(k)0 〉. As before, Alice and Bob send
identical copies of |ψ(k)x 〉 until the desired error probability ε
is attained. Note that Eq. (6) converges to Eq. (3) for k = m,
and for k = 1 it converges to
|ψ(1)x 〉=
m⊗
j=1
| j〉
∣∣∣q(1)E(x) j〉, (7)
which reproduces Eq. (1) written in the qubit basis and ap-
pended with basis vectors | j〉.
For each index j= 1, . . . ,dm/ke, the referee measures the j-
th pair of signals received from Alice and Bob as follows. As
in the adapted original protocol, they perform a direct sum of
the qubit-basis beamsplitter measurement and the controlled-
swap measurement on the first and second terms of the de-
composition
1
k ∑i∈I[ j,k]
[
|i〉
∣∣∣q(k)E(x)i〉 |i〉 ∣∣∣q(k)E(y)i〉]
+
1
k ∑l,h∈I[ j,k]
l 6=h
[
|l〉
∣∣∣q(k)E(x)l〉 |h〉 ∣∣∣q(k)E(y)h〉] , (8)
4and decide NotEqual on any outcome “dark port detection”
or “anti-symmetric”. For k = m this measurement converges
to the measurement used in the adapted original protocol, and
for k = 1 the second term of the decomposition (8) disappears
and this measurement converges to the qubit-basis beamsplit-
ter measurement. The worst case error probability of this mea-
surement is derived in Appendix B 1.
As noted in the previous section, this measurement can
equivalently be decomposed as a direct sum of the controlled-
swap measurement with an unambiguous state discrimination
measurement.
As shown in Eq. (6), each signal contains k qubit states,
each chosen from the set {|q(k)0 〉, |q(k)1 〉}. We will choose these
qubits to satisfy 〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉= 1−k/m, which converges to the
adapted orginal and optical protocols for k = m and k = 1 re-
spectively, and which has information leakage O(logn) (see
Section IV A). For a given block size k and repetition number
r, our interpolation uses rdm/ke signals, each of dimension
2k, exhibiting a trade-off between the number of signals sent
and the dimension of each signal.
III. OPTICAL PROTOCOLS
In this section we consider several families of optical co-
herent state simultaneous message passing model protocols
which reduce the number of signals below that of the exist-
ing protocols. In Section III A we introduce optical protocols
for equality and Euclidean distance which reduce the number
of signals by a factor 1/2 and reduce the information leak-
age below that of the existing optical protocols of [2] and [5].
In Section III B we introduce two families of optical equality
protocols which further reduce the number of signals, but find
numerical evidence that they increase the information leak-
age in both the ideal and experimental settings, even under an
abstract, optimal measurement performed by the referee.
A. Improved optical protocols for equality and Euclidean
distance
In our improved optical equality protocol, two bits of E(x)
are encoded into each signal by utilizing the imaginary com-
ponent of the phase space representation of coherent states,
which reduces the number of signals by a factor 1/2. Codelet-
ters 01/10 are encoded into phases ±i, and codeletters 00/11
are encoded into phases ±1, as shown in Figure 1. Explicitly,
the parties send the states
|αx〉EQ,2 =
m⊗
j=1
odd
∣∣∣∣∣(−1)E(x) j · (i)E(x) j⊕E(x) j+1 α√m/2
〉
j
. (9)
The referee uses the same beamsplitter measurement as in
the existing optical protocol: she interferes pairs of signals
in a beamsplitter, measures the dark port with a single pho-
ton threshold detector, and decides NotEqual if at least one
outcome “dark port detection” occurs. As before, the desired
error probability ε is attained through appropriate choice of
α .
The above states have the same total mean photon number
|α|2, and give rise to the same error probability, as the ex-
isting optical protocol. To show the second statement, recall
that the probability of “no dark port detection” depends only
on the squared distance between the amplitudes of the incom-
ing pair of coherent state signals (2). For pairs of codeletters
(E(x) j,E(x) j+1) and (E(y) j,E(y) j+1) which differ by one bit
this quantity is given by w2 = |α|2/m as in the existing opti-
cal protocol (see Figure 1), and for pairs which differ by two
bits this quantity is 2w2, which gives rise to the same proba-
bility of “no dark port detection” as the existing optical pro-
tocol (see Appendix B 2). By the information leakage bound
∼ O(|α|2 logmk) (where mk is the number of signals) derived
in Appendix C, our improved protocol has lower information
leakage than the existing protocol. It can be shown that this
statement also holds under the stronger bound derived in Sec-
tion IV B for |α|2  mk using standard approximation tech-
niques. Below we will refer to this protocol, including its use
of the beamsplitter measurement, as the two-bit protocol.
Re[β ]
Im[β ]
w w
√
2w110 000
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111
FIG. 1: Gray coding of k−bit blocks into a ring of coherent
states in phase space for k = 1 (blue), k = 2 (blue and red
combined), and k = 3 (blue, red and teal combined). Here,
β is the coherent state amplitude of each signal. For k = 1,
β1 = α/
√
m; for k = 2, β2 = α/
√
m/2; and in general, βk =√
µk/(m/k), where µk is the total mean photon number of the
total state.
We improve the existing optical Euclidean distance proto-
col of [5] in similar fashion. In the existing protocol, Alice
and Bob receive real unit vectors u,v ∈ Rs respectively and
prepare the states
|αu〉ED,1 :=
s⊗
j=1
|u jα〉 j. (10)
The referee interferes each pair of signals received from Alice
and Bob in a beamsplitter and measures both output ports with
5single photon threshold detectors. The quantity ‖u− v‖2 is a
function of |α|2 and the expected difference between the num-
ber of detections observed in the two output ports, so using
Chernoff bounds the referee can estimate ‖u− v‖2 to within
an additive constant ε with probability at least 1− δ by re-
peating the protocol O(log(1/δ )/ε2) times [5].
As in our improved equality protocol, our improved Eu-
clidean distance protocol utilizes the imaginary component of
the phase space representation of coherent states to reduce the
number of signals by a factor 1/2. Alice and Bob prepare the
states
|αu〉ED,2 :=
s⊗
j=1
odd
|(u j + iu j+1)α〉 j, (11)
and the referee uses the same measurement as before. These
states have the same total mean photon number |α|2, and it
can be shown using nearly identical analysis to [5] that the
measurement outcome statistics are also the same. Thus, as
before, our protocol has lower information leakage than the
existing protocol under the information leakage bound of Ap-
pendix C. Alternatively, one can adapt the existing protocol
to evaluate the Euclidean distance between two complex unit
vectors u,v ∈ Cs using the same measurement and the states
(10).
B. Families of optical equality protocols
In this section we introduce two families of optical coher-
ent state equality protocols which further reduce the number
of signals. In Section III B 1 we find numerical evidence that
these protocols have higher information leakage than the two-
bit protocol in the ideal setting, even under the optimal mea-
surement. In Section III B 2 we find numerical evidence of the
same behaviour under realistic experimental imperfections.
1. Ideal setting
We first describe our families of optical equality protocols
in the ideal setting. In the ring (lattice) protocol with block
size k, blocks of k bits of E(x) are encoded into one of 2k co-
herent state signals arranged in a ring (lattice) in phase space
using a Gray code, as shown in Figure 1. The size of the ring
(lattice) is determined by the desired error probability ε , and
is held constant for all signals.
The ring (lattice) Gray code is a mapping from k-bit strings
to a ring (lattice) of coherent state signals which satisfies the
property that all nearest neighbour signals differ in exactly one
bit [12–14]. Note that in the ring encoding, each coherent
state signal has two nearest neighbours, while in the lattice
encoding a given coherent state signal can have as many as
four nearest neighbours. We have chosen this code so that
a greater number of bit differences between two k-bit blocks
of E(x) and E(y) corresponds to greater distinguishability be-
tween the two coherent state signals. In Appendix B 2 we
107 108 109 1010 1011
n
500
1000
5000
1×104
5×104
QIL
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FIG. 2: Quantum information leakage (QIL), measured in
bits, as a function of the input size n for our ring protocols to
attain error probability ε = 0.01 in the ideal setting.
prove that this is the optimal encoding of k-bit blocks of bi-
nary codewords for all k = 2,3,4, and that it outperforms an
analogous encoding of q−ary codewords.
We consider two different measurements performed by the
referee. The beamsplitter measurement proceeds identically
to that of Section II A: the referee interferes pairs of signals in
a beamsplitter and measures the dark port with a single pho-
ton threshold detector. She decides NotEqual if at least one
outcome “dark port detection” occurs. Recall that the error
probability under the beamsplitter measurement is one-sided,
i.e. there is zero error for equal inputs. We also consider the
optimal one-sided error measurement, which is described in
Appendix B 3, and is shown to have error probability lower
bounded by the square of the error probability of the beam-
splitter measurement.
In Figure 2 we plot the information leakage of the ring en-
coding under the bound of Section IV B, compared to the clas-
sical information leakage lower bound of [6]. We have opti-
mized over δ and assumed the code E saturates the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound [15–17]
n
m
= 1−h(δ ). (12)
For k = 1,2,3 we plot the information leakage under the
beamsplitter measurement, and for k = 4,5,6 we lower bound
the information leakage under the optimal measurement us-
ing the quadratic bound on the error probability derived in
Appendix B 3. We see that the one-bit and two-bit protocols
have the lowest information leakage (they are numerically in-
distinguishable in this parameter regime). We have observed
the same result for ε in the range [10−5,10−2] in both the ring
and lattice protocols.
Before continuing on to consider experimental imperfec-
tions, we argue that for fixed block size k, both the ring and lat-
tice protocols have asymptotic information leakage O(logn)
in the ideal setting. In Appendix C we show that any simul-
taneous message passing model protocol which uses mk co-
herent state signals and fixed maximum total mean photon
number µmax,k has information leakage ∼ O(µmax,k logmk).
Note that mk = m/k = O(n) by the fact that E is a constant
rate code. Furthermore, in Appendix B 2 we show that any
fixed error probability is attained with µmax,k constant in n.
6Together, these results imply that the information leakage is
O(logn).
2. Experimental imperfections
In the experimental setting, for larger block sizes the states
have fewer signals, so dark counts have less effect on the er-
ror probability. In this section we find numerical evidence
that despite this effect, the two-bit protocol still outperforms
the ring protocols with block size k > 2 in the experimental
setting, and speculate that the same result holds for the lattice
protocols.
The experimental ring protocol uses the same states and
beamsplitter measurement as in the ideal setting. However,
to account for transmittivity η the initial total mean photon
number µk is rescaled to µk/η , and to account for dark count
probability pdark per signal the referee uses a different crite-
ria to decide Equal or NotEqual. The referee decides NotE-
qual if the number of outcomes “dark port detection” exceeds
a threshold value Tk which is chosen to minimize the worst
case error probability over all inputs x,y ∈ {0,1}n (which is
no longer one-sided when pdark > 0). This technique is based
on that introduced in [3] for experimental implementation of
the existing optical protocol.
Now we determine the optimal threshold value Tk. Define
a random variable DE,k for the number of outcomes “dark
port detection” given equal inputs. Define DD,k identically,
but for different inputs which have the lowest expected num-
ber of outcomes “dark port detection”. For a given thresh-
old value T ′k , the worst case error probability is then given
by max{Pr(DE,k ≥ T ′k ),Pr(DD,k < T ′k )}. As the first (second)
element is monotonically decreasing (increasing) with T ′k , it
follows that the optimal threshold value Tk satsifies
Pr(DE,k ≥ Tk) = Pr(DD,k < Tk), (13)
which is also the worst case error probability of the protocol
under this choice. Note that Eq. (13) may not attain exact
equality due to the fact the threshold value must be an integer,
so both probabilities are step functions.
In our considered parameter regime, it can be shown that
the number of clicks are well-approximated by binomial dis-
tributions DD,k ∼ Bin(m/k, pD,k) and DE,k ∼ Bin(m/k, pE,k),
where
pD,k = (1− (kδ −bkδc))
(
1− e−|βk|
2
[
1−cos
(
2pi
2k
bkδc
)])
+(kδ −bkδc)
(
1− e−|βk|
2
[
1−cos
(
2pi
2k
(bkδc+1)
)])
+ pdark
pE,k = pdark (14)
for all k = 1, . . . ,6 under the Gray code (see Appendix B 2),
where βk =
√
µk/(m/k) is the amplitude of each coherent
state signal. We have used this approximation to calculate Tk
and the corresponding worst case error probability (13).
In Figure 3 we plot the information leakage of the ring pro-
tocols under the bound of Section IV B for realistic experi-
mental imperfections, compared to the classical information
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n
500
1000
5000
1×104
5×104
1×105
QIL
Ring protocol with experimental errors
k=1, v=.99
k=1, v=1
k=2,v=1
k=3,v=1
k=4,v=1
k=5,v=1
Classical
lower bound
FIG. 3: Quantum information leakage (QIL), measured in
bits, as a function of the input size n for our ring protocols to
attain error probability ε = 0.01 under transmittivity η = 0.3
and dark count probability pdark = 7.3×10−11. Existing
optical protocol with interferometric visibility 99% included
for reference.
leakage lower bound of [6]. For given values of m, k, δ , and
pdark we have chosen the signal amplitude βk to attain the de-
sired error probability ε under the approximation (14). As
before, we have optimized over δ and assumed the code E
saturates the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (12). This plot uses
worst case error probability ε = 0.01, transmittivity η = 0.3,
and dark count probability per signal pdark = 7.3×10−11. We
include a plot of of the existing optical protocol with inter-
ferometric visibility 99% for reference. We observe the same
hierarchy as the ideal setting, but as dark counts have less ef-
fect for protocols sending fewer signals, the k = 2 (two-bit)
protocol now has visibly lower information leakage than the
k = 1 protocol. We have also observed the same hierarchy for
pdark in the range [0,10−9] and ε in the range [10−5,10−2]. We
speculate that the same behaviour holds for the lattice protocol
under experimental imperfections.
IV. INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In this section we bound the information leakage of the pro-
tocols we have considered. The quantum information leak-
age of a simultaneous message passing model protocol Π in
which, conditioned on input x, Alice (Bob) sends state σx to
the referee, is given by [18]
QIL(Π) = max
P∈Pr(X×Y )
I(XY : AB)ρ , (15)
where
ρ = ∑
x,y∈{0,1}n
P(x,y)|xy〉〈xy|XY ⊗σAx ⊗σBy .
For every protocol we consider, σx = |ψx〉〈ψx| is pure, which
implies H(AB|XY ) = 0, so Eq. (15) reduces to
QIL(Π) = max
P∈Pr(X×Y )
H(AB)ρ . (16)
To bound the information leakage, we will find an orthonor-
mal basis for the Hilbert space used in each protocol such that
7the expectation values of |ψx〉〈ψx|w.r.t. this basis form a fixed
probability vector Λ for all x ∈ {0,1}n. The Schur-Horn the-
orem [19, 20] then implies ρAB  Λ⊗2, so H(AB) ≤ H(Λ⊗2)
(see, e.g. [21]), which implies
QIL(Π)≤ 2H(Λ) (17)
by the additivity of entropy under tensor product. While not
all simultaneous message passing model protocols will have
such a basis, we do find such a basis for both the interpolation
and optical ring protocol families, and use this technique to
bound their information leakage as O(logn). In Appendix C
we bound the information leakage of the optical lattice proto-
col family asO(logn) (for which we were unable to find such
a basis). Our Appendix C bound also holds for the optical
ring protocols, but we have found numerically that our bound
of this section is 15−40% lower in the considered parameter
regime. This follows intuitively from the fact that the bound in
this section takes into account the particular form of the states
used, whereas the Appendix C bound simply projects onto a
neighbourhood of the total mean photon number.
A. Information leakage for family of interpolation protocols
Here we bound the information leakage for the family
of interpolation protocols under the choice of qubit overlap
〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉= 1− k/m as O(logn):
Proposition 1. For any fixed error probability ε > 0, there
exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that for every positive integer n
the following holds: for all k = 1, . . . ,m (where m is the length
of the codewords E(x) ∈ {0,1}m), the information leakage of
the interpolation protocol with block size k and qubit overlap
〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉= 1− k/m is no greater than C log(n).
As a corollary, for block size k being given by any func-
tion of n such that k(n) ∈ [m] for each n, the family of proto-
cols which uses the interpolation family with block size k(n)
for each n has information leakage O(logn). For example, k
could be held to a fixed constant as in the existing optical pro-
tocol, or the ratio k/m could be held fixed as in the original
protocol.
Proof. We prove that the information leakage is upper
bounded by C′r logn for some C′ > 0. In Appendix B 1 we
show that for fixed error probability ε , the repetition number
r is fixed, completing the proof.
Note that the states
|φ (k)x 〉=
dm/ke⊗
j=1
[√
1− pk |00〉
+
√
pk
2k ∑i∈I[ j,k]
|i〉
(
|0〉+(−1)E(x)i |1〉
)]
for pk = 1− |〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉 | reproduce the overlap structure of
the states |ψ(k)x 〉, so by Property 3 of [11] (reviewed in Sec-
tion II A) they are equal up to a change of basis. For all
x ∈ {0,1}n, the diagonal entries of |φ (k)x 〉〈φ (k)x | are given by
Λ⊗dm/keI,k =
(
1− pk, pk2k , . . . ,
pk
2k
)⊗dm/ke
. (18)
Thus, by Eq. (17) the information leakage of the interpolation
protocol with block size k under the choice pk = k/m is upper
bounded by
QIL(ΠIk)≤ 2dm/kerH(ΛI,k)
= 2dm/ker
[
(1− k/m) log
(
1
1− k/m
)
+(k/m) log(2m)
]
≤ 2r(2+(1+ k/m) log(2m)). (19)
As E is a constant rate code, then m is linear in n, so this
quantity is upper bounded by C′r logn for some fixed constant
C′ > 0.
B. Information leakage for family of optical ring protocols
Here we bound the information leakage for the family of
optical ring protocols described in Section III B 1. We use a
similar technique as in the information leakage bound for the
family of interpolation protocols, and write the states in a basis
for which the diagonal entries form a fixed probability vector
Λ.
For block size k and total mean photon number µk, each
signal consists of one of 2k coherent states equally spaced on
a ring with amplitude βk =
√
µk/(m/k). Formally, each signal
is contained in the set
Sk =
{∣∣ω jβk〉〈ω jβk ∣∣, j = 0, . . . ,2k−1} , (20)
where
ω = exp
[
2pii
2k
]
. (21)
As ω jl = ω jn for all n ≡ l mod 2k, then the states in Sk are
equal to
∣∣ω jβk〉= e−|βk|22 2k−1∑
l=0
ω jl ∑
h≡l mod 2k
β hk√
h!
|h〉 (22)
for j = 0, . . . ,2k−1, which can be written in a basis as
2k−1
∑
l=0
ω jlλl |l〉 (23)
for
λl = e
−|βk|2
2
√√√√ ∑
h≡l mod 2k
|βk|2h
h!
. (24)
In this basis, the diagonal entries of each state in Sk form the
probability vector ΛO,k = (λ 20 , . . . ,λ
2
2k−1).
8Writing each signal of the states used in the optical ring
protocol in this basis, for all x ∈ {0,1}n the diagonal entries
of the transformed states are given by Λ⊗m/kO,k . By Eq. (17)
and additivity of entropy under tensor product, the informa-
tion leakage of the optical ring protocol ΠOk with block size k
is upper bounded by
QIL(ΠOk )≤
2m
k
H(ΛO,k). (25)
This bound is straightforward to calculate in practice, and
was used to produce Figures 2 and 3. We have found nu-
merically that this bound gives an advantage of 15-40% over
the bound of Appendix C in our considered parameter regime.
This bound can also be used to prove the asymptotic informa-
tion leakageO(logn) for any fixed block size k using standard
techniques.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we developed several families of quantum fin-
gerprinting protocols. One family demonstrates a trade-off
between the number of signals sent and the dimension of each
signal. The other families use coherent state signals arranged
in a ring and lattice in phase space, thus catering to optical im-
plementations. We found that one such coherent state protocol
reduced the number of signals from the existing coherent state
protocol by a factor 1/2, while also reducing the information
leakage. Although the other protocols in the ring and lattice
families use even fewer signals, we found convincing numer-
ical evidence that they have higher information leakage under
the bounds we have used. It would be interesting to investigate
whether some other family of coherent state protocols might
further reduce the number of signals while maintaining or re-
ducing the information leakage, and whether our information
leakage bounds could be improved.
We also proved that a simple beampslitter measurement
similar to that used in [7] performs optimal unambiguous state
comparison between two coherent states given with equal a
priori probabilities. It would be interesting to explore whether
a similar measurement could be used to perform optimal un-
ambiguous state comparison of coherent states given with ar-
bitrary a priori probabilities.
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VII. APPENDIX
Appendix A: Beamsplitter measurement in qubit basis, and
optimal unambiguous state comparison with a beamsplitter
Here we explicitly write any set of two coherent states
{|β0〉, |β1〉} in a basis as qubits, and construct a measurement
in this basis (based on a measurement introduced in [8]) which
reproduces the outcome probabilities of the beamsplitter mea-
surement described in Section II A. Using a result of [8] we
then find that a beamsplitter measurement with single photon
threshold detectors placed at both output ports performs op-
timal unambiguous state comparison on {|β 〉, |−β 〉} for any
complex number β when the states are given with equal a pri-
ori probabilities.
We begin by writing {|β0〉, |β1〉} in a basis as qubits. Let
β = 12 (β0−β1) and
|qa〉= e
−|β |2
2
[√
cosh(|β |2) |0〉+(−1)a
√
sinh(|β |2) |1〉
]
=
√
1− p |0〉+(−1)a√p |1〉 (A1)
for p = exp[−|β |2]sinh(|β |2). It is straightforward to verify
that |〈q0,q1〉|= |〈β0,β1〉|, so by Property 3 of [11] (reviewed
in Section II A), the sets {|q0〉, |q1〉} and {|β0〉, |β1〉} are equal
up to a change of basis.
Now we review a measurement (introduced in [8]) in the
qubit basis which reproduces the outcome probabilities of the
beamsplitter measurement described in Section II A, i.e. on
input |qa〉 |qb〉 for a,b ∈ {0,1}, it outputs “different” (previ-
ously, “dark port detection”) with probability 1− |〈qa,qb〉|,
and fails to output “different” with probability |〈qa,qb〉|.
The measurement is a direct sum of an unambiguous state
discrimination measurement and a controlled-swap measure-
ment on the first and second terms of the decomposition
|qa〉 |qb〉=(1− p) |00〉+(−1)a+b p |11〉
+
√
p(1− p)[(−1)b |01〉+(−1)a |10〉]. (A2)
Operationally, a non-destructive measurement is first per-
formed with two measurement operators, the first (second)
of which projects onto the subspace containing the first (sec-
ond) term of the decomposition (A2). If it projects onto the
first term, the remaining state takes one of two forms depend-
ing on the equality of a and b. In this case, an unambiguous
state discrimination (USD) measurement is performed to dis-
tinguish between these two states. In particular, the USD mea-
surement is performed which is optimal for the case in which
each state is given with equal a priori probabilities [22]. Of
course, this choice is sub-optimal for different a priori proba-
bilities, but we make it because it gives rise to a measurement
which reproduces the outcome probabilities of the beamsplit-
ter measurement. We refer to the two unambiguous outcomes
of this measurement as “plus” and “minus” corresponding to
the two possible states of the first term of Eq. (A2), and the
inconclusive outcome as “?”. If the non-destructive measure-
ment projects onto the second term of Eq. (A2), a controlled-
swap measurement is performed (which effectively projects
9onto the symmetric and anti-symmetric subspaces). Outcomes
“minus” and “anti-symmetric” are mapped to a single out-
come “different” which unambiguously determines a 6= b, and
occurs with probability 1−|〈qa,qb〉| [8], thus reproducing the
outcome probabilities of the beamsplitter measurement.
Following [8], we map outcomes “plus” and “symmetric”
to a single outcome “same” which unambiguously determines
a = b with probability 1− ∣∣〈qa,qb〉∣∣ for b = 1⊕b [8]. In [8]
it is shown that when the states are given with equal a priori
probabilities, this measurement performs optimal unambigu-
ous comparison between the cases a = b and a 6= b, i.e. it
minimizes the probability of an inconclusive outcome “?”.
On input |(−1)aβ 〉 ∣∣(−1)bβ〉 to a beamsplitter with sin-
gle photon threshold detectors placed at both the light and
dark ports, the dark port registers a detection with probabil-
ity 1− |〈(−1)aβ ,(−1)bβ 〉 | and the light port registers a de-
tection with probability 1− |〈(−1)aβ ,(−1)bβ 〉 |, which are
identical to the outcome probabilities of the above optimal un-
ambiguous state comparison measurement in the qubit basis.
Thus, this beamsplitter measurement performs optimal unam-
biguous state comparison on {|β 〉, |−β 〉} when the states are
given with equal a priori probabilities.
Appendix B: Error analysis
In Appendix B 1 we calculate the worst case error proba-
bilities for the family of interpolation protocols, which we use
in Section IV A to show that they have information leakage
O(logn).
In Appendix B 2 we calculate the worst case error proba-
bilities for the family of optical ring protocols described in
Section III B, which we use in Section IV B and Appendix C
to show that they have information leakage O(logn). We also
prove optimality of these protocols over several similar pro-
tocols which use coherent state signals arranged in a ring in
phase space, and state without proof analogous results for op-
tical lattice protocols.
In Appendix B 3 we determine the optimal one-sided er-
ror measurement for any simultaneous message passing model
equality protocol, and show that the worst case error probabil-
ity is lower bounded by the square of the error probability of
the beamsplitter measurement. We use these results in Sec-
tion III to show numerically that larger block sizes k do not
outperform the two-bit protocol, even under the optimal mea-
surement.
For most protocols that we consider, each signal encodes
several bits of E(x) ∈ {0,1}m. For different inputs x 6= y ∈
{0,1}n, the error probability depends on the distribution of the
bit differences between the codewords across the signals. For
a given code, the worst case distribution over the particular 2n
codewords could be difficult to calculate. Instead, for most
arguments we make the following simplifying assumption.
Remark 1. In calculating the worst case error probability of
a protocol, we assume that the code is uncharacterized apart
from its minimum distance, and take the worst case over all
strings EA 6= EB in the output space of the code which differ
by at least the minimum distance.
1. Error analysis for family of interpolation protocols
Here we calculate the worst case error probability of the
interpolation protocol with block size k for any choice of pos-
itive qubit overlap 〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉 ≥ 0. Similar results hold for
arbitrary overlap, but we make this assumption because it
simplifies the algebra. We then show that under the choice
〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉 = 1− k/m the error probability is upper bounded
by 2−δ r, for repetition number r denoting the number of iden-
tical copies of |ψ(k)x 〉 sent. This implies that for a given desired
error probability ε , the repetition number can be fixed inde-
pendent of n. We use this fact in the proof of Proposition 1
that the information leakage of the interpolation is O(logn).
As mentioned in Remark 1, the worst case is taken over all
strings EA 6= EB ∈ {0,1}m which differ by minimum distance
mδ bits. To determine the worst case over this set, we first
calculate the probability that the referee’s measurement on the
j-th pair of signals of |ψ(k)xy 〉 returns “dark port detection” or
“anti-symmetric” under the assumption that EA,i 6= EB,i for d
indices i∈ I[ j,k]. Recall that the qubit-basis beamsplitter mea-
surement is performed on the first term of the decomposition
(8), and the controlled-swap measurement is performed on the
second term.
Recall that on input |q(k)0 〉 |q(k)1 〉, the qubit-basis beamsplit-
ter measurement outputs “dark port detection” with probabil-
ity 1−〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉 (see Eq. (2) and Appendix A). Thus, when
d bits differ the qubit-basis beamsplitter measurement on the
first term of the decomposition (8) outputs “dark port detec-
tion” (“D”) with probability
PrIk(“D”|d bits differ) =
d
k2
(
1−〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉
)
. (B1)
Recall that on input |ψ〉, the controlled-swap outputs “anti-
symmetric” with probability ‖ 12 (1−W) |ψ〉‖2, where W is
the operator which swaps Alice and Bob’s systems. It follows
that the controlled-swap on the second term of the decompo-
sition (8) outputs “anti-symmetric” with probability
PrIk(“A-S”|d) =
1
4k2 ∑i,l∈I[ j,k]
i 6=l
∥∥∥|q(k)E(x)i〉 |q(k)E(y)l 〉−|q(k)E(y)i〉 |q(k)E(x)l 〉∥∥∥2
=
1
2k2
[
k(k−1)− ∑
i,l∈I[ j,k]
i6=l
〈q(k)E(x)i ,q
(k)
E(y)i
〉〈q(k)E(y)l ,q
(k)
E(x)l
〉
]
=
1
2k2
[
k(k−1)− (k−d)(k−d−1)
−2d(k−d)〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉−d(d−1)〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉
2
]
The first and second equalities are straightforward. The third
follows from the fact that (k−d)(k−d−1) terms in the sum
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are equal to one, 2d(k− d) terms have one bit different, and
d(d − 1) terms have two bits different. Let “no detection”
(“ND”) denote the event that neither “dark port detection” nor
“anti-symmetric” occur for a given signal. After simplifica-
tion, the probability PrIk(“ND”|d) of outcome “no detection”
when the two k-bit blocks differ by d bits is given by
PrIk(“ND”|d) = 1−PrIk(“D”|d)−PrIk(“A-S”|d)
= 1− d
k
pk
(
1− (d−1)pk
2k
)
, (B2)
where pk = 1−〈q(k)0 ,q(k)1 〉. For a given distribution of bit dif-
ferences d1, . . . ,dm/k beetween two codewords among the m/k
blocks, the total error probability for repetition number r is
given by
PrIk(Err|d1, . . . ,dm/k) =
m/k
∏
i=1
PrIk(“ND”|di)r, (B3)
which reproduces Eq. (5) for pk = 1 and k = m in the worst
case d = mδ , as expected.
Now we prove that the worst case error probability for each
block size k occurs when all bit differences between the code-
words are consolidated into the fewest number of signals. In-
deed, by straightforward calculation it can be shown that for
all 0≤ pk ≤ 1, for every pair of integers 1≤ d,c≤ k−1 such
that d ≥ c,
PrIk(“ND”|d)PrIk(“ND”|c)≤ PrIk(“ND”|d+1)PrIk(“ND”|c−1),
which proves the claim. Thus, the worst case error probability
is given by
PrIk(Err) =[
1− pk
(
1− (k−1)pk
2k
)]⌊mδ
k
⌋
r [
1− pk tk
(
1− (t−1)pk
2k
)]r
(B4)
for t the remainder given by mδk =
⌊
mδ
k
⌋
+ tk .
In what follows, we show that under the choice pk = k/m
the worst case error proability is upper bounded by a constant
to the power r. This implies that any fixed error ε can be at-
tained with fixed repetition number. We use this fact in Propo-
sition 1 to show that the information leakage of the interpola-
tion under this choice is O(logn).
Under the choice pk = k/m, the worst case error probability
is upper bounded by 2−δ r:
PrIk(Err|pk = k/m) =[
1− k
m
(
1− (k−1)
2m
)]⌊mδ
k
⌋
r [
1− t
m
(
1− (t−1)
2m
)]r
≤
[
1− k
m
(
1− k
2m
)]⌊mδ
k
⌋
r [
1− t
m
(
1− t
2m
)]r
≤
[
1− k
m
(
1− k
2m
)]mδ
k r
≤ 2−δ r (B5)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m. The equality follows from simplification
of Eq. (B4). The first inequality is straightforward, and the
second and third both follow from the fact that the function
[1−x(1− x2 )]1/x is strictly increasing with x for all 0 < x < 1.
2. Error analysis for family of optical protocols
Here we derive the worst case error probability of the opti-
cal ring protocol described in Section III B with block size k,
which we use in Section IV B and Appendix C to bound the
information leakage as O(logn). We also prove that for all
k = 1, . . . ,4 the ring Gray code is an optimal encoding of k-
bit blocks of binary codewords into coherent states arranged
in a ring in phase space. We then show that the ring Gray
code outperforms an alternative which uses q−ary codewords.
We state without proof analogous results for the optical lattice
protocols.
Lemma 1. For any positive integer k, the ideal ring proto-
col described in Section III B 1 with block size k, using the
Gray code, states of total mean photon number µk, and the
beamsplitter measurement described in Section II A, satisfies
the following.
The worst case error probability PrOk (Err) is upper bounded
by
exp
[
−µk
[
1− (1− (kδ −bkδc))cos
(
2pibkδc
2k
)
− (kδ −bkδc)cos
(
2pi(bkδc+1)
2k
)]]
. (B6)
Furthermore, if the worst case error probability is taken over
all codewords EA 6= EB ∈ {0,1}m which differ by at least the
minimum distance mδ bits (as described in Remark 1), this
bound is attained with equality for all 0≤ δ ≤ 3/k.
As a corollary, since every binary code with more than two
codewords has minimum distance δ ≤ 1/2, then for all k =
1, . . . ,6, the worst case error probability PrOk (Err) is given by
Eq. (B6) with equality in the ideal setting.
Proof. The error probability of the beamsplitter measurement
is given by the probability that “no dark port detection”
(“ND”) occurs for every pair of signals. The worst case error
probability depends on the worst case distribution of the bit
differences between the codewords across the signals. To up-
per bound the worst case error probability, we first bound the
probability PrOk (“ND”|d) of “ND” when a pair of k-bit blocks
differ by d bits. As a property of the Gray code, nearest-
neighbour coherent state signals in phase space correspond
to blocks which differ by one bit. Thus, for any pair of blocks
which differ by d bits, the corresponding pair of coherent state
signals must be spaced at least d steps apart on the ring. It fol-
lows that PrOk (“ND”|d) is upper-bounded by the probability
of “ND” when the pair of coherent state signals are spaced d
steps apart on the ring, which is given by
PrOk (“ND”|d)≤ exp
[
−|βk|2
(
1− cos
(
2pid
2k
))]
, (B7)
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which follows from straightforward calculation using equa-
tion 2 (recall βk =
√
µk/(m/k) is the signal amplitude). For
d = 1,2,3 under the Gray code, Eq. (B7) is satisfied with
equality (see Figure 1 or [12]).
Now we upper bound the worst case error probability using
the bound (B7) for each signal. For a given distribution of bit
differences d1, . . . ,dm/k among the blocks, the error probabil-
ity is given by
PrOk (Err|d1, . . . ,dm/k) =
m/k
∏
i=1
PrOk (“ND”|di)
≤ exp
[
−µk + |βk|2
m/k
∑
i=1
cos
(
2pidi
2k
)]
. (B8)
Note that
cos
(
2pid
2k
)
+ cos
(
2pic
2k
)
≤ cos
(
2pi
2k
⌊
d+ c
2
⌋)
+ cos
(
2pi
2k
⌈
d+ c
2
⌉)
for all 1 ≤ d,c ≤ k. This can be proven by direct calculation
for k = 3, and for k ≥ 4 it follows from the fact that the func-
tion cos(2piν)+ cos(2pi(a−ν)) is strictly decreasing with ν
whenever 0≤ ν < a−ν < 14 , along with the fact that k2k ≤ 14 .
It follows that the righthand side of Eq. (B8) is maxi-
mized for strings EA 6= EB ∈ {0,1}m such that the bit dif-
ferences d1, . . . ,dm/k are evenly distributed among the m/k
blocks and differ by minimum distance mδ bits. In this case,
m
k (kδ − bkδc) pairs of signals differ by bkδc+ 1 bits, andm
k (1− (kδ −bkδc)) pairs differ by bkδc bits, giving rise to
the bound (B6). Below, we refer to this case of inputs as ad-
jacent.
If δ ≤ 3/k, then mδ ≤ 3m/k, so when the mδ bit differences
are evenly distributed among the m/k blocks, di ≤ 3 for all
i= 1, . . . ,m/k. As mentioned above, under the Gray code such
inputs satisfy Eq. (B7) with equality for every signal, and thus
also satisfy Eq. (B6) with equality.
In the experimental setting, it can be shown using simi-
lar techniques to those used in the proof of Lemma B6 that
adjacent inputs give rise to the lowest expected number of
outcomes “dark port detection” in our considered parameter
regime. The approximation 14 to the behaviour of the random
variable DD,k follows using standard techniques.
Now we prove statements of optimality for the Gray code
in the optical ring protocols. Analogous results also hold for
the lattice protocols.
Proposition 2. In all protocols considered below, assume the
referee uses the beamsplitter measurement described in Sec-
tion II A, and that the worst case error probability is taken
over all codewords EA 6= EB ∈ {0,1}m which differ by at least
the minimum distance mδ bits, as described in Remark 1.
For any positive integer k, the ideal ring protocol described
in Section III B 1 with block size k, using states of total mean
photon number µk, satisfies the following: For all 0 ≤ δ ≤
2/k, the Gray code minimizes the worst case error probability
over all encodings of k-bit blocks of binary codewords into a
ring of equally spaced coherent state signals in phase space.
As a corollary, since every binary code with more than two
codewords has minimum distance δ ≤ 1/2, the Gray code is
optimal for all k = 1, . . . ,4.
Proof. We prove optimality of any encoding in which nearest
neighbour coherent state signals differ by one bit (of which
the Gray code is an example). First we show that for any such
encoding, the worst case error probability is given by Eq. (B6)
with equality. For any such encoding, any pair of coherent
state signals which are second-nearest neighbours correspond
to a pair of blocks which differ by two bits, and thus satisfy
Eq. (B7) with equality. By the same arguments used to prove
Lemma 1, it follows that the worst case error probability for
all δ ≤ 2/k under any such encoding is given by Eq. (B6) with
equality.
Now we show that any encoding for which there exist
nearest-neighbour coherent state signals which differ by d′ ≥
2 bits has worst case error probability greater than Eq. (B6).
The case assumptions δ ≤ 2/k and d′ ≥ 2 imply mδ ≤ d′m/k.
Thus, there exist codewords which differ in mδ bits and for
which the bit differences d1, . . . ,dm/k are distributed among
the m/k blocks such that di = d′ for mδ/d′ indices i, and all
other bit differences are zero. Furthermore, the codewords
can be chosen so that for every index i satisfying di = d′, the
corresponding pair of coherent state signals are nearest neigh-
bours in phase space. Such codewords clearly give rise to er-
ror probability greater than Eq. (B6). Here we have assumed
d′ divides mδ , but similar techniques can be used to prove the
same statement in the case when d′ does not divide mδ .
We have shown that under certain conditions, the Gray code
is an optimal encoding of binary codewords into a ring. We
now consider another family of optical ring protocols which
map q-ary codewords into q equally-spaced nodes on a ring.
Under the assumption that all codes saturate the Gilbert -
Varshamov bound, we show that the Gray coding of binary
codewords outperforms this family for all q powers of two.
An analogous result holds for the lattice protocols.
Proposition 3. In all protocols considered below, assume all
codes saturate the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Furthermore,
assume that the referee uses the beamsplitter measurement de-
scribed in Section II A, and that the worst case error probabil-
ity is taken over all codewords EA 6= EB in the output space of
the code which differ by at least the minimum distance of the
code, as described in Remark 1.
Let q be any power of two. For all ε > 0, for any q-ary
ring protocol described above which attains error probability
ε with total mean photon number µq and mq signals, the ring
protocol described in Section III B with block size k = logq
and Gray coding can attain the same error probability ε with
the same total mean photon number µq and fewer than mq
signals.
As a corollary, because the ring protocol with block size
k = logq uses the same total mean photon number and fewer
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signals than the q-ary ring protocol, then it has lower infor-
mation leakage under the bound derived in Appendix C. It
can also be shown that this statement holds under the stronger
bound derived in Section IV B when n µq using standard
approximation techniques.
Proof. Let mq denote the length of the q−ary code (i.e. the
number of “qits” in the code), and let δqmq denote its min-
imum distance (i.e. the minimum number of differing qits
between codewords). It is easy to see that the worst case error
probability occurs when the codewords EA 6= EB ∈ [q]mq dif-
fer by δqmq qits, and every pair of differing qits correspond to
nearest-neighbour coherent state signals; and is given by
Prq(Err) = exp
[
−µqδq
(
1− cos
(
2pi
q
))]
. (B9)
As the q−ary code saturates the (q−ary) Gilbert-Varshamov
bound, the quantity δq satisfies
n
mq
= logq−δq log(q−1)−h(δq) (B10)
and 0≤ δq < 1−1/q [17]. Note that Eq. (B10) is the ratio of
n to the number of signals used.
Now consider the ring protocol with block size k = logq
using the Gray code, the same total mean photon number, the
beamsplitter measurement, and minimum distance
δ =
δq
logq
. (B11)
Note that
δ <
1− 1q
logq
<
2
logq
. (B12)
The first inequality follows from δq < 1−1/q and the second
is straightforward. By Lemma 1, the inequality (B12) implies
that the worst case error probability is given by Eq. (B9) with
equality. As the code saturates the Gilbert-Varshamov bound,
the ratio of n to the number signals is given by
n
m/ logq
= (1−h(δq/ logq)) logq. (B13)
For all 0 ≤ δq < 1− 1/q, we now show that the righthand
side of Eq. (B10) is no greater than the righthand side of Eq.
(B13), which implies that this protocol sends fewer signals
than the q-ary ring protocol, completing the proof.
After substituting logq = k and δq = kδ , the desired in-
equality becomes
h(δ )
δ
− h(kδ )
kδ
≤ log(2k−1) (B14)
for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ (1− 2−k)/k. Using standard calculus tech-
niques, it can be shown that the lefthand side of Eq. (B14) is
a strictly increasing function of δ . Thus, the inequality need
only be shown for δ = (1− 2−k)/k, which is proven using
standard techniques.
3. Optimal measurement
Here we derive the optimal one-sided error measurement
for any simultaneous message passing model equality proto-
col. We then show that the error probability of the optimal
measurement is lower bounded by the square of the error prob-
ability of the beamsplitter measurement. We use these results
in Section III to show numerically that the optical protocols
with block size k > 2 do not outperform the two-bit protocol,
even under the optimal measurement.
Consider a general setting in which the referee receives a
state σABz , where z is contained in one of two sets EQ or NEQ.
The referee then wishes to determine whether z is contained
EQ or NEQ under the constraint that if z ∈ EQ they never err.
It is straightforward to show that the measurement {ΠEQ,1−
ΠEQ} (the projection onto the space spanned by the image of
the states σABz∈EQ and its orthogonal complement) minimizes
the worst case error probability of this task.
Proposition 4. In the setting described above, for
EQ = {(x,x) : x ∈ {0,1}n}
NEQ = {(x,y) : x 6= y ∈ {0,1}n}, (B15)
if
σAB(x,y) = |ψx〉〈ψx|⊗ |ψy〉〈ψy| (B16)
for all x,y ∈ {0,1}n, then the error probability on input x 6=
y ∈ {0,1}n is lower bounded by ∣∣〈ψx,ψy〉∣∣2.
As a corollary, since the error probability of the beamsplit-
ter measurement in the optical protocols is given by | 〈ψx,ψy〉 |
on coherent state inputs (see Eq. (2) and the subsequent dis-
cussion), then the error probability of the optimal measure-
ment is lower bounded by the square of the error probability
of the beamsplitter measurement.
Proof. The error probability is lower bounded by
〈
ψxψy
∣∣ΠEQ ∣∣ψxψy〉≥ 2 ∣∣〈ψx,ψy〉∣∣2
1+
∣∣〈ψx,ψy〉∣∣2 ≥
∣∣〈ψx,ψy〉∣∣2 .
The second inequality is straightforward and the first is de-
rived by considering only the first two terms of the decompo-
sition
ΠEQ = |ψxψx〉〈ψxψx|+ |φ〉〈φ |+ . . . , (B17)
where |φ〉 is the normalized component of ∣∣ψyψy〉 orthogonal
to |ψxψx〉.
Appendix C: Information leakage for families of optical ring
and lattice protocols.
Here we bound the information leakage of any pure state
simultaneous message passing model protocol in which every
state
∣∣ψxy〉 is a tensor product of mk coherent states with total
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mean photon number lying in a fixed range [µmin,µmax] for
all x,y ∈ {0,1}n. In Section III B 1 we use these results to
bound the information leakage of the families of optical ring
and lattice protocols described as O(logn).
In Appendix C 1 we give a practical bound on the infor-
mation leakage using a continuity bound on entropy. Due
to the dimension dependence of the continuity bound, this
bound does not give the desiredO(logmk) limiting behaviour,
but has the advantage of being straightforward to calculate in
practice. In Appendix C 2 we bound the asymptotic behaviour
as O(logmk).
1. Practical information leakage bound
Here we use an extension of Theorem 1 of [2] and a con-
tinuity bound on entropy to bound the information leakage of
any simultaneous message passing model protocol satisfying
the conditions outlined above.
By Eq. (16), the information leakage is equal to the entropy
of ρAB, maximized over prior distributions P∈ Pr(X×Y ). We
use the Fannes-Audenaert inequality
H(ρAB)≤ H(ΓAB)+ γ logdim(AB)+h(γ), (C1)
which bounds H(ρAB) in terms of H(ΓAB), γ =
1
2
∥∥ρAB−ΓAB∥∥1, and dim(AB) for any state ΓAB [23, 24]. We
choose ΓAB =Π0ρABΠ0/Tr(Π0ρAB), where Π0 projects onto
a “typical subspace” of ρ , given by the set of Fock states of
total photon number lying within some radius ∆ ∈ N of the
interval [µmin,µmax], as in [2]. By straightforward extension
of Theorem 1 of [2],
〈
ψxy
∣∣Π0 ∣∣ψxy〉≥ 1−max{0,e−µmin( eµminµmin−∆
)µmin−∆}
− e−µmax
(
eµmax
µmax+∆
)µmax+∆
, (C2)
and
logdim(Π0)≤ (µmax+∆) log(µmax+∆+mk−1)
+ log(µmax−µmin+2∆+1). (C3)
We choose any ε ′ > 0 (which can be optimized over), and fix
∆ such that
〈
ψxy
∣∣Π0 ∣∣ψxy〉≥ 1− ε ′.
We now bound the quantities H(ΓAB), γ , and dim(AB) for a
given choice of ε ′. First, by the dimension bound on entropy,
H(ΓAB) is upper bounded by Eq. (C3). Second,
γ ≤ 1
2 ∑x,y∈{0,1}n
P(x,y)
∥∥∥∥|ψxy〉〈ψxy|− Π0|ψxy〉〈ψxy|Π0Tr(Π0ρAB)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ∑
x,y∈{0,1}n
P(x,y)
√
1− ∣∣〈ψxy ∣∣Π0 ∣∣ψxy〉∣∣2
≤
√
1− (1− ε ′)2
<
√
2ε ′ (C4)
where the first inequality is the triangle inequality, the
second is the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality along with
Tr(Π0ρAB) ≤ 1, the third is our parameter choice ensuring
that
〈
ψxy
∣∣Π0 ∣∣ψxy〉 ≥ 1− ε ′, and the fourth is straightfor-
ward. Third, as there are 22n states |ψxy〉, they span at most a
22n-dimensional space. Combining these bounds, the Fannes-
Audenaert inequality gives
H(ρAB)≤ logdim(Π0)+2n
√
2ε ′+h(
√
2ε ′). (C5)
The quantity (C5) holds for any distribution P, and thus upper
bounds the information leakage. Although this bound is easily
calculable in practice, it is linear in n. For all optical protocols
we consider, n is linear in mk, so this bound does not give the
desired O(logmk) asymptotic behaviour.
2. Information leakage asymptotic analysis
Here we prove the O(logmk) asymptotic information leak-
age of any simultaneous message passing model protocol sat-
isfying the conditions outlined above. By Eq. (16), the in-
formation leakage is equal to the entropy of ρAB, maximized
over prior distributions P ∈ Pr(X ×Y ). We bound H(ρAB) as
O(logmk) by projecting onto Fock states lying within tele-
scoping neighbourhoods ∆0,∆1, . . . of [µmin,µmax].
In general, consider any projective measurement
{Π0,Π1 . . . ,} (with possibly infinitely many measurement
operators), and define an isometry
V =
∞
∑
j=0
Πi⊗| j〉⊗| j〉 ∈ U(AB,ABC1C2). (C6)
Then,
H(AB)ρ = H(ABC1C2)VρV †
= H(C1)+H(AB|C1C2)
≤ H(C1)+H(AB|C1)
≤ H(C1)+
∞
∑
j=0
Pr(C1 = j) logdim(Π j), (C7)
where the first equality follows from the fact that isometries
preserve entropy and the second equality follows from the
chain rule and H(C1C2) = H(C1). The first inequality follows
from strong subadditivity, and the second inequality follows
from the dimension bound on quantum entropy.
For a fixed positive integer ∆, let
∆0 = {N ≥ 0 : µmin−∆≤ N ≤ µmax+∆}
∆ j = {N ≥ 0 : j∆+1≤ µmin−N ≤ ( j+1)∆
or j∆+1≤ N−µmax ≤ ( j+1)∆} (C8)
for each j = 0,1, . . . . Let Π j be the projection onto the space
of Fock states with total photon number lying in the set ∆ j.
Then the set {Π0,Π1, . . .} forms a measurement.
We now show that Pr(C1 = j) decreases exponentially with
j and logdim(Π j) isO(logmk) for each j (with prefactors not
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growing too quickly with j) to bound Eq. (C7) as O(logmk).
Using similar techniques to those used to prove Theorem 1 of
[2], it can be shown that
Pr(C1 = j)≤ e−µmax
(
eµmax
µmax+ j∆
)µmax+ j∆
(C9)
for all j= 0,1, . . . under the simplifying assumption ∆> µmax,
and
logdim(Π j)≤ (µmax+( j+1)∆) log(µmax+( j+1)∆+mk−1)
+ log(∆) for all j = 1,2, . . . (C10)
It is straightforward to show that under these bounds the infi-
nite sum appearing in the second term of Eq. (C7) converges
and is O(logmk).
It is also straightforward to show that H(C1) is no greater
than the entropy of the µmax Poisson distribution, which is
finite and constant in mk (in fact, it is well-approximated by
1
2 log(2pieµmax) when µmax  1 [25]). Thus, the asymptotic
information leakage is O(logmk).
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